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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal investment policies for pension funds of a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB)
type. The nature of a DB fund induces a natural modeling of preferences being of the mean-
downside risk type. With compensation for inﬂation as an explicit goal of a pension fund, a
natural reference point for the risk measure is the future (indexed) value of the liabilities.
Results are presented for diﬀerent levels of inﬂation uncertainty and its correlation with stock
returns. The optimal decision rules show increased risk-taking for funding ratios moving away
from the discounted value of the reference point. Furthermore, it is shown that the outcomes
are comparable with those using a mean-downside deviation criterion. We provide intuition
for the results and compare the outcomes with actual investment policies of six large Dutch
pension funds.
Key words: pension funds, optimal investment, deﬁned beneﬁt, mean-shortfall, loss aversion,
asset-liability management.
1 Introduction
In analyzing investment policies for pension funds, most of the ﬁnancial literature has
settled on the use of the mean and variance of investment returns to measure
performance. For example, Randall and Satchell (1997) compare the eﬃciency of
diﬀerent portfoliosfor pension fund assets with respect to the mean and variance of
the return. Such an analysis has the advantage of being able to use the standard
toolkit of mean-variance analysis as developed by Markowitz (1952). The disadvan-
tage, however, is that it does not take into account that pension funds experience a
serious downside when returns are (too) low. See also Owadally and Haberman
(2004), who minimize a quadratic measure of the variability of contribution and
market value of plan assets. Randall and Satchell (1997) already notice that pension
funds cannot aﬀord ‘to lose a huge amount of money, even if they are frequently
making small amounts of money. This asymmetry is not accounted for by a model
which is deﬁned over mean and variance only’.
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A similiar weak point is present in the literature on pension funding that uses
stochastic control to solve for optimal contribution/investment policies, see Boulier,
Trussant, and Florens (1995), Boulier, Michel, and Wisnia (1996), Cairns (2000),
Haberman and Sung (1994), and Vigna and Haberman (2001). Using stochastic
control is well motivated by the dynamic multi-period nature of the pension fund’s
problem. However, using a traditional utility function in terms of surplus or quad-
ratic penalty function on the contribution rate is not in accordance with pension
fund managers who care about the negative consequences of having a less-than-
fully funded pension fund. Denning the funding ratio as the value of assets divided
by the present value of liabilities, underfunded pension plans have a funding
ratio below 100%. Depending on the regulatory situation, undcrfunding is
implicitly or explicitly associated with costs and penalties. The implicit costs vary
from a lost of trust to a lower fraction in stocks, while the explicit costs can range
from higher contributions to explicit penalties. Taking this institutional reality into
account is the aim of the present paper. Using a stylized model for a DB pension fund
that incorporates an explicit penalty for underfunding, I show that the optimal
investment policy diﬀers remarkably from the outcomes obtained from a traditional
approach.
That a pension funds is more sensitive to under- than to overfunding is already
explicitly acknowledged operationally in the practice of Asset/Liability Management
(ALM). Many deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension funds base their strategic investment
policy on so-called ALM studies. ALM uses techniques from the ﬁeld of operations
research to optimize funding and investment policies under uncertainty. See Ziemba
and Mulvey (1998) for an extensive overview of the use of and research into ALM.
Relevant for the current paper is that the risk measures used in most ALM studies are
downside risk measures. Downside risk measures explicitly deﬁne risk in terms of the
downside to all possible outcomes. Good illustrations of the use of downside risk
measures are Sortino and Van der Meer (1991), Harlow (1991), Carin˜o et al. (1994),
and Boender (1997). However, given its strong roots in operations research, most
literature on ALM focuses on the computational side of ALM problems only. See,
for example, Zenios (1995) Kusy and Ziemba (1986), Hiller and Eckstein (1993),
Maranas et al. (1997) and Zenios et al. (1998). The approach taken by Haberman
et al. (2003a) and Haberman et al. (2003b) resembles the ALM approach, analyzing a
mean-shortfall optimization and using indiﬀerence curves and eﬃcient frontiers to
evaluate the outcomes. In this paper, we take a downside risk measure from the ﬁeld
of ALM, but focus the analysis on the qualitative outcome in terms of the optimal
investment policies. As such, the novelty of our approach is not in the risk measure or
subject of analysis, but rather in the comparative statics that have not been analyzed
in this context before.
Finally, an extra argument for using a downside risk measure is that it represents
the notion of loss aversion. Introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss
aversion is a behavioral concept that captures the notion that people are more
sensitive to losses than to gains. Although the debate on rationality of loss aversion is
not ﬁnished, it does provide extra support for studying pension funding in a downside
risk framework.
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Section 2 introduces the representative model for a DB pension fund. Section 3
derives implications for pension fund investment policy in a relevant setting, and
considers the sensitivity of the results to the speciﬁcation of uncertainty. In Section 4
we explore empirical evidence of loss averse preferences for pension funds by
examining actual pension fund investment policies. Policy implications are discussed
in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
It is instructive to list the fundamental properties of DB pension funds, on which
we base the formulation of the model that is introduced next. A DB fund can be
characterized by three basic features:
(a) participants each pay the same fraction of their salary to obtain ﬁxed pension
rights as a percentage of their current or ﬁnal salary,
(b) the fund is supervised by an independent regulator,
(c) there is a single investment and funding policy.
First, (a) implies that DB pension funds embed a strong form of solidarity, in
that the link between contributions paid and new pension rights is only an indirect
one. Since contribution is a ﬁxed fraction of wages and the same for all participants,
not depending on age, younger workers partly pay for the older workers.
Older workers are closer to retirement, so, given the same salary, an extra pension
dollar has a higher actuarial1 value for older workers than for the younger
ones. Hence, since the contributions are the same, the younger generations are
partly ﬁnancing the pension rights of the older generations. Another aspect that
makes the link between contributions and pension rights complex, is that contribu-
tions will vary with the ﬁnancial status of the fund. If the pension plan is under-
funded, extra contributions are necessary without there being any added pension
beneﬁts.
The regulator mentioned in feature (b) checks the ﬁnancial status of the fund,
quality of the management, and serves as protector of the rights of the active and
inactive participants. The ﬁnancial status of a fund can be summarized by the funding
ratio, which is the ratio of assets over the present value of the liabilities. Feature (c)
follows from the solidarity embedded in the fund’s setup. All workers pay an equal
fraction of their salary that is determined once a year. The solidarity across workers
and across generations implies that the investment and funding decisions also have to
be taken for the collective.
In this paper, we analyze the investment problem for a stylized DB fund as deﬁned
above. Consider a pension fund at time 0 (now) with current wealthW0. At time T in
the future, pension liabilities ofWB need to be covered. The decision to be taken is the
amount X0 of wealth to invest in a risky asset yielding a gross return of ut at each
period. The rest (W0xX0) is invested in a risk-free asset with gross return rf in
each period. Finally, the objective of the fund favors more wealth over less
1 The actuarial value of a future cash ﬂow is just the net present value, corrected for survival.
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and punishes shortfall below the benchmark level WB. The formulation of the
optimization problem is given by
max
X0
E[WT]xl  E[(WBxWT)+] , (1)
s:t: WT=(W0xX0)rTf+X0 
QT
t=1
ut, (2)
where (y)+ is the maximum of 0 and y and l the aversion to shortfall. The symbols
rf and ut represent the returns on the investment categories available to the fund. In
practice, pension funds will invest in more than only two categories, but we can take
the uncertain return ut to represent the return on a market portfolio of risky assets.
WT is a natural representation for the total value of assets of the fund at time T. The
choice for the static model excludes the possibility of policy changes between time 0
and T. Thus, the decision X0* gives an initial asset mix that is the optimal starting mix
for a buy-and-hold strategy over the whole planning period. The static model is
straightforward to analyze, and the solution is representative of the solution to the
multi-stage model, see Siegmann and Lucas (2005).
We will refer to the model in (1) and (2) as the mean-shortfall model. However, an
explicit feature of the model is that it represents the notion of loss aversion. Loss
aversion in economics was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The work
of Kahneman and Tversky has become the starting point for most literature on
behavioral ﬁnance, for a good overview, see Hirshleifer (2001) or Shleifer (2000). The
relevance for the present paper is that the downside risk model is thus rooted in
behavioral evidence on decision making under uncertainty. This can be added to
the motivation based on the institutional setting of DB pension funds. See also
Haberman et al. (2003a), and Haberman et al. (2003b), who use the mean-shortfall
model in a simulation model of optimal pension funding.
Our objective function is quite diﬀerent from most existing literature on optimal
pension funding. Boulier, Trussant, and Florens (1995), Boulier, Michel, and Wisnia
(1996), Cairns (2000), and Owadally and Haberman (2004) minimize a quadratic
penalty function on the contribution rate. Haberman and Sung (1994, 2002), and
Vigna and Haberman (2001) minimize a quadratic penalty function on the deviation
of funding and solvency values from their respective targets, punishing unfavorable
outcomes as well as favorable ones.
A limitation of the objective function in (1) is that it is one dimensional ; that is, it is
deﬁned in terms of the single variableWT. The real objective for a DB fund, however,
consists of several competing objectives. Typical objectives are: minimal contribu-
tions, maximal indexation of pensions, and minimal risk with respect to funding.
With respect to the latter, the key ratio that is reported as a measure of ﬁnancial
soundness of a fund is the actuarial funding ratio. It is simply the value of assets
divided by the present value of the liabilities,W0/W0
B. Another measure is the surplus,
which can be deﬁned as W0xW0B. Now, if the funding ratio (or surplus) is high, the
risk of underfunding is low, the contribution level can be lowered, and indexation can
fully compensate for inﬂation. Hence, in the simple model of pension fund invest-
ment, we use an ALM objective that is only deﬁned in terms of the surplus of the
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fund, which has a 1–1 relation with the funding ratio. If the surplus is high, the other
objectives are met at the same time. If the surplus is low, or if there is a deﬁcit, the
associated consequences are carried over to the other objectives ; for example, for a
fund with a low funding level, contributionsare raised and indexation might
be postponed. See Boender and Vos (2000) for an analysis of the mechanism of
allocating ﬁnancial risks over multiple objectives for a pension fund, which they call
risk budgeting.
Our approach compares with that of Leibowitz et al. (1992), who model shortfall
aversion of pension funds by incorporating a shortfall constraint on the ‘surplus
return’. The usefulness of their approach is that they explicitly reckon with the
duration of pension liabilities versus the duration of available ﬁxed-income instru-
ments. However, the problem with their setup is that a solution does not always
exist, namely when the constraint cannot be met. In our case, using a penalty
on shortfall, we can solve the optimal policy for a pension fund that currently
experiences a deﬁcit.
2.1 Pension liabilities
Interpreting WB is key to the present paper. It is the reference level relative to which
either a gain or a loss is measured. For a DB pension fund, a natural candidate for the
reference level is the future value of the liabilities that need to be covered at time
T. Such a value is the present value of the pension rights built up by the participants,
and is obtained by discounting the future pension payments by an appropriate
discount rate.
At this point, we need to discuss the role of inﬂation and indexation in the objective
of the fund. There are several factors that inﬂuence the liabilities of a DB pension
fund, WB in our model, such as the career developments of individual (active)
members, and wage inﬂation. However, for simplicity we only focus on the most
important factor: inﬂation2 Of course, it is possible for a pension fund to only oﬀer a
nominal guaranteed pension, but it is clear that participants are interested foremost
in the pension rights in terms of the future purchasing power that the pension
provides. This is the reason that most collective and company pension plans in the
Netherlands, and still a signiﬁcant number of pension plans in the US, oﬀer indexed
pension schemes.
The aim of indexation is to compensate for inﬂation, which eats into the purchas-
ing power of a pension dollar. That brings about a direct link between inﬂation and
the future nominal level of the liabilities, WB. Given a level of inﬂation over the
planning period of p, and a level WBcur representing the liabilities at today’s prices/
wages,WB is given by
WB=(1+p)  WBcur , (3)
where 1+p is the gross inﬂation factor, assuming annual compounding. The setup in
(3) makes it easy to study the eﬀect of inﬂation on the optimal investment policy.
2 In practice, it makes a large diﬀerence whether pension funds consider price or wage inﬂation. However,
for the current paper this diﬀerence is not relevant, so we will just use the term ‘inﬂation’ to refer to either
price or wage inﬂation.
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Also, because indexation is an explicit aim of DB pension plans, and given the extra
complexity of adding another decision variable, that is, indexation cuts, we only
consider unconditional indexation in this paper.
2.2 Planning horizon
We choose the length of the planning period equal to T=15 years, intended to match
the duration of the liabilities of an average pension fund. In an attempt to explain the
equity premium puzzle (about the historical risk-adjusted return on stocks being too
high from an equilibrium perspective), Benartzi and Thaler (1995) postulate that
investors and pension funds are loss averse and myopic, that is, T=1 year. They
motivate the suggestion of myopia by pointing out that investors account for their
gains and losses at the end of each year. However, from the outset, myopia is
unrealistic for pension funds. Pension fund managers frequently express their view
that they are, and should be, long-term investors, and should not be pinned down on
one-year performance ﬁgures. This view is consistent with the practice of motivating
investment policies by ALM studies that calculate risk and return over a long-term
horizon.
Note that even with the horizon of 15 years, we still analyze a static problem, since
recourse actions at intermediate stages are not allowed – see Section 2. For details on
the multi-stage setup and its solution, see Siegmann and Lucas (2005). For traditional
utility functions of constant relative/absolute risk aversion, Campbell and Viceira
(2002) give the conditions for which a multi-period investment problem reduces to
a repeated single-period problem. However, their results do not carry over to the
mean-downside risk framework. Also, in Siegmann and Lucas (2005) it is shown
the single-period problem suﬃces for analyzing the qualitative outcomes of the
mean-shortfall model.
2.3 Shortfall risk
The objective function in (1) involves the maximization of wealth (or surplus), with a
penalty on the expected amount of deﬁcit below 100% actuarial funding. Loss
aversion with respect to deﬁcits below WB represents that, in a DB system, the
liabilities need to be covered by available assets. The formulation in (1) allows for a
deﬁcit. The parameter l represents the aversion to shortfall. In the context of pension
funds, the extent of shortfall aversion is inﬂuenced by the fund’s ﬂexibility in a
situation of underfunding. A fund with much ﬂexibility with regard to jumps in the
contribution rate, additional capital injections by the sponsor, lowering of pension
rights, and skipping of indexation, might be less shortfall averse than a fund that does
not have such ﬂexibility.
3 Results
This section presents the optimal investment policies for the DB pension fund
presented in Section 2. Subsection 3.1 deals with the basic model in which inﬂation p,
and thusWB, is assumed constant. We take rf such that the actuarial discount rate of
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4% is correct. Subsection 3.2 speciﬁes a joint probability distribution of inﬂation and
the stock return. Subsection 3.3 presents the results for an alternative speciﬁcation of
downside risk, one which is often used in ALM studies.
3.1 Base case
In the most simple case, we assume thatWB, the inﬂation-protected level of liabilities
at time T, is known with certainty at time 0, so inﬂation p is a known constant. As the
planning horizon is 15 years, a reasonable assumption for the expectation of inﬂation
is 2% per year, the inﬂation ceiling for the medium term of the European Central
Bank (ECB). That makes WB=(1.02)T .WBcur . Assuming that the current practice of
using an actuarial discount rate of 4%, we set the risk-free return to an annual 6.1%,
that is, rf=1.061. With a ﬁxed inﬂation rate, the only uncertainty in the model now
comes from the yearly return on the risky asset ut. We take ut to have a lognormal
probability distribution with an average return of 10% and standard deviation of
17%, representing typical historical ﬁgures for stock returns.
The analytical characterization of the solution to model (1) is presented in the
appendix. However, ﬁnding the actual optimum still involves computing an integral.
Therefore, to ﬁnd the numerical optimum we resort to simply optimizing model (1)
numerically with a standard solver, like the one available in Excel. This needs a
concrete distribution of the 15-year return Pt=1
15 ut, for which we use the discretized
lognormal distribution mentioned above. Doing this for diﬀerent values of the initial
wealth W0 results in optimal (wealth, investment) pairs (W0, X0
*). Figure 1 shows the
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Figure 1. Optimal fraction invested in stocks for the base case
Note : This ﬁgure shows the optimal investment in stock as a fraction of
initial wealth against the funding ratio for diﬀerent values of the loss
aversion parameter l. T=15, and utylognorm (0.085, 0.16), which
gives an average return of 10% and standard deviation of 17%.
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resulting optimal fractions X0
*/W0 as a function of the funding ratio W0/W0
B for
diﬀerent values of the loss-aversion parameter l. Table 1 lists the values of l and the
associated probabilities of shortfall or surplus.
The numbers in Table 1 show that for a high degree of shortfall aversion, the
probability of underfunding is very low, but so is the probability of becoming funded
again when underfunded. A larger tolerance for shortfall creates a higher probability
of underfunding, but also increases the odds that an underfunded pension fund can
get out of underfunding. These results follow intuition and are a feature of the risk
measure.
Figure 1 shows that the optimal decision rules for the optimization problem have a
typical V-shape: below 100% funding risk taking increases with shortfall, while
above 100% funding risk taking increases with surplus. This behavior is closely
linked to the mean-shortfall objective as formulated in (1). In a surplus situation, an
increase in the funding ratio creates more room for risk taking for the same level of
(expected) shortfall. Such a mechanism is also present in models with a traditional
utility function, where the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing in wealth.
However, a traditional approach cannot generate at the same time the left-hand side
of the V-shape that we see in Figure 1. There, an initial shortfall position leads to
more risk taking for a decreasing funding ratio. The intuition is that the shortfall
cannot be avoided with certainty, and thus a certain amount of risk taking is
warranted to decrease the expected shortfall. To see that at least some risk taking
under shortfall is optimal, consider the case with an inﬁnite penalty on shortfall and
no risk taking. Then, from an initial position of shortfall, taking a little risk decreases
the shortfall by an amount initially equal to the risk premium on the risky asset. Thus,
the left-hand side does not correspond with a gambling strategy. Models that result in
such a strategy assume that an agent has nothing more to lose below a certain point,
and thus gambles everything. In our model, however, an explicit penalty is given to
shortfall, explicitly modeling that there is something to lose.
The ﬁgure also has a number of interesting consequences. First consider the shape
of the optimal funding policy. For a funding ratio of 100%, the real pension liability
is fully covered. In this case, the optimal allocation does not contain stocks and thus
represents a minimum-risk portfolio. At a funding ratio of more than 100%, the
surplus asset value leads to an increasingly higher fraction in stocks, using the risk
premium on stock investment to make the fund even wealthier (in expectation).
Table 1. The values of l used to compute the optimal investment decisions in Figure 1
l P (underfunding) P (overfunding)
15.2 10% 16.8%
26 5% 11.8%
110 1% 7.8%
Note : The second column lists the probability of underfunding, given a positive initial surplus.
The third column gives the probability that the ﬁnal surplus is positive, given a negative initial
surplus.
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At funding ratios below 100%, stock investments increase in the extent of under-
funding. When the pension liabilities cannot be guaranteed with certainty anymore,
the fund has to take risks to prevent a further erosion of the pension claims. A higher
percentage in stocks is the only way to reach the benchmark WB with positive prob-
ability. In a real-world setting, an alternative to increasing X0 can be an increased
contribution from the side of the sponsor, or a more frugal pension claim by lowering
indexation. Both alternatives can be visualized as having the eﬀect of shifting the
ﬁnancial position of the fund to the right on the horizontal axis of Figure 1, either by
increasing the numerator or by decreasing the denominator of the funding ratio.
Second, observe that the loss aversion parameter l has a decreasing eﬀect on the
steepness of the V-shape in Figure 1. This corresponds to intuition: a higher loss
aversion leads to a safer asset mix, as the certainty of the risk-free return becomes
more attractive than the possible extra return on stocks. For the rest of this paper, we
take l=110, representing a 1% probability of underfunding. It is important to note
that an inﬁnitely large l does not make the left-hand side of the V-shape ﬂat. In the
Appendix we show that the optimal strategy starting from a shortfall position for
lpO is a minimum-risk strategy with respect to expected shortfall, and always
contains an investment in the risky asset (given a positive equity premium).
Third, pension funds usually use an ALM study to support an investment policy
that is aimed at holding a ‘strategic mix’. The ﬁgure shows, however, that the optimal
initial asset mix for the 15-year period depends on the initial funding ratio. This
suggests that holding the same mix whatever the funding ratio is not a good idea from
an optimization point of view. The empirical results in Section 4 also show that the
fraction of stocks is not constant for the funds examined.
So far, we have assumed a deterministic value for WB. In the next subsection we
consider the robustness of the shape of the decision rules to the introduction of an
inﬂation rate that is uncertain.
3.2 Inﬂation uncertainty
The uncertainty surrounding future inﬂation is an important source of risk for a DB
pension fund. Some developed countries have inﬂation-protected bonds available,
but for most countries inﬂation-linked bonds are just not available, or in anycase not
in the right quantities. In all, dealing with an uncertain inﬂation rate is relevant for
most DB pension funds. Even if the market for inﬂation swaps becomes larger and
more liquid, it remains to see whether pension funds would be inclined to bear the
costs of protection, given their large investment horizon.
With an uncertain inﬂation rate p, and the reference point WB in the objective
function, (1) becomes a stochastic variable. Now, to have simple and tractable
modeling of the joint distribution of stock returns and inﬂation, we assume log-stock
returns and inﬂation are modeled as bivariate normal. This way, we can deﬁne the
covariance matrix S of the log series as
;= s
2
p r  spsu
r  spsu s2u
 
, (4)
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where r is the correlation coeﬃcient between inﬂation p and the log-stock return u.
For the stock return we take a mean of 10% and standard deviation of 17%. These
correspond to a normal distribution with m=0.085 and s=0.16 for the log-stock
return. Mean inﬂation is set to 2% and rf=1.061. The following analysis will consider
diﬀerent values for the variance, and also, with suﬃcient controversy over the size of
the correlation between inﬂation and stock returns, the parameter r is varied in the
analysis, starting from a value of zero. Results for varying values of the standard
deviation sp of inﬂation are in Figure 2.
From Figure 2 we observe the same basic pattern as in Figure 1, that is, the
percentage in stocks has a V-shaped relation with the funding ratio. The diﬀerence
with Figure 2 is that the kink of the V does not lie at a zero stock investment. The
minimum risk portfolio contains stocks. When inﬂation can only be hedged partially,
the bottom line is that there is always uncertainty with respect to the level of the ﬁnal
pension payment.
Next, we consider the optimal solution to the loss-averse model when the corre-
lation between stocks and inﬂation is non-zero. In the long run, stocks are considered
a partial hedge for inﬂation risk. This is one of the motivations for investing in
stocksin case of indexed pension claims, see Leibowitz et al. (1994). Randall and
Satchell (1997) ﬁnd a positive correlation for UK data of 0.16 between equity and
paid-out pensions. However, for Dutch data from 1956 to 1994, Dert (1995) ﬁnds an
annual negative correlation coeﬃcient ofx0.24 between log-stock returns and price
inﬂation.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of changes in the correlation r between stock returns and
inﬂation. For a given funding ratio, a higher correlation results in a larger stock
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Figure 2. Optimal stock investment under inﬂation uncertainty
Note : In this ﬁgure the optimal stock fractions for model (1) are
plotted for diﬀerent values for sp, the standard deviation of the
inﬂation. l=110, T=15, r=0, utylognorm (0.085, 0.16).
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investment. The eﬀect on the investment policy is only moderate, however. With a
correlation of 90%, which is very high, the maximum diﬀerence in fraction of stocks
compared with no correlation is 15 percentage points. It is surprising that this eﬀect
is so limited. As mentioned before: the presence of correlation between stock returns
and inﬂation motivates stock investment as an inﬂation hedge. Given that the true
correlation is suggested to lie between 0.1 and 0.5, this motivation seems to be of
limited importance in practice. The positive risk premium of stocks is more important
than the eﬀect of a positive correlation with inﬂation.
3.3 Downside deviation
The mean-shortfall model was selected because of its simplicity, having an analytical
characterization of the optimal solution. In practice, however, ALM for pension
funds predominantly uses downside deviation as the risk measure. Therefore, we now
explore the sensitivity of the outcomes to taking downside deviation. The analytical
outcome for the case of a ﬁxed benchmark is studied in Siegmann and Lucas (2005).
Using downside deviation as a risk measure boils down to taking quadratic
shortfall. The popularity of its use is due to the fact that it punishes large losses more
than proportionally than small losses. In analogy to the formulation of the mean-
shortfall problem in equations (1) and (2), the formulation of the objective becomes
max
X0
E[WT]xn  E([(WBxWT)+])2, (5)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Fr
ac
tio
n 
st
oc
ks
Funding ratio
ρ=0
ρ=0.5
ρ=0.9
Figure 3. Optimal stock investment for diﬀerent correlation coeﬃ-
cients
Note : In this ﬁgure the optimal stock fractions for model (1) are plotted
for diﬀerent values for r, the correlation coeﬃcient between the
log-stock return and inﬂation. sp=0.01, l=110, T=15, utylognorm
(0.085, 0.16).
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s:t: WT=(W0xX0)rTf+X0 
QT
t=1
ut, (6)
with the parameters deﬁned as before, and T=15. The diﬀerence with the objective
function (1) is the power of 2 in the second term of (5), as well as a diﬀerent loss-
aversion parameter, n, representing the change in risk measure. Figure 4 shows three
panels with the results of the sensitivity analyses of the previous section, but now for
downside deviation as the risk measure.
Starting with the top left panel and comparing with Figure 1, we recognize an eﬀect
of the V-shape moving in the upper-left direction. Also, while the left-hand side of the
V more or less stays in the same position, the right-hand side is much more sensitive
to values of n. In the absence of inﬂation uncertainty, Siegmann and Lucas (2005)
provide analytical results for the solution under a downside-deviation risk measure.
The top-right, and lower-left panel show the eﬀect of uncertainty in inﬂation on the
outcomes. We ﬁnd that sp and r have the same eﬀect on the decision rule as in the
mean-shortfall model. Increasing inﬂation uncertainty makes the minimum-risk
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Figure 4. Optimal policies for the downside-deviation objective
Note : Top left panel shows the optimal stock investment fraction for diﬀerent values of the
loss aversion parameter n, inﬂation constant at 0.02, r=0, uylogN (0.085, 0.16), rf=1.061.
The values of n have been chosen to roughly compare with the 1%, 5%, and 10% prob-
abilities of underfunding, as in Figure 1. For n=8, the top right panel shows the solution for
diﬀerent values of the standard deviation of inﬂation, as in Figure 2. The lower left panel has
diﬀerent values for the correlation between inﬂation and log-stock returns, r, while sp is kept
at 0.01, compare Figure 3.
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point of the V-shape shift to the right. Increasing correlation between inﬂation and
stock returns, the minimum stock allocation increases, as does the fraction of stocks
for positive surpluses. As in Figure 3, the left-hand side of the V is not aﬀected
signiﬁcantly by a positive correlation.
4 Empirical evidence
The previous sections have shown the speciﬁc investment policies that are optimal in
the mean-shortfall framework representing a DB pension fund. To test if the frame-
work is indeed representative of a DB fund, the strategies that are followed in reality
should be comparable with our results. This section provides a ﬁrst reality check of
the results, by analyzing historical investment policies followed by six of the largest
Dutch pension funds.
Table 2 shows the asset values and funding ratios of the six pension funds. ABP is
the pension fund for all Dutch government personnel, and the largest in terms of asset
value in The Netherlands (and second in the world). The Shell pension fund is for
employees of Royal Dutch Shell. PGGM is the fund for workers in the health sector.
Philips is obviously for Philips workers. BPMT is the fund for people working in the
steel and technical industries. Finally, SPF is the fund that covers the pension for
workers at one of the companies associated with the Dutch railways. In total, these
funds represent 58% of the total of pension assets in The Netherlands of 435 billion
Euro in 2001.
Ultimo 2001, all six funds in Table 2 are overfunded, that is, they have a funding
ratio larger than 100%. However, an expected real interest rate lower than the
actuarial rate used of 4% shifts the location of the kink of the V-shape to the
right. Given a current interest rate that is far lower than 4% plus inﬂation, a
V-shaped optimal policy would thus be located to the right of a 100% actuarial
funding ratio based on 4% discounting. Put otherwise, a funding ratio of, for
example, 110% need not be enough to protect the future value of the pension
rights in a risk free manner. With this in mind, Figure 5 presents the scatter plots
of the funding ratio versus fractional stock investment for the six pension funds
Table 2. Six large Dutch pension funds
Fund Asset value (bln e) Funding ratio ultimo 2001
ABP 147.3 1.12
Shell 12.2 1.39
PGGM 49.1 1.12
Philips 14.7 1.28
BPMT 17.5 1.18
SPF 9.9 1.45
Note : This table presents assets and funding ratios for six of the largest Dutch pension
funds. Data are collected from annual reports and data from the Vereniging van
Bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen (VVB).
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listed in Table 2. Table 3 lists annual returns for representative stock and bond
indices.
As can be seen in Table 3, the years 1997 to 2000 have witnessed an enormous surge
in stock prices, followed by a decline in 2000 and 2001. Bond returns have shown the
exact opposite patterns, while one-year interest rates have been fairly stable. For
pension funds, the variability of liability growth is very small compared with that of
stock returns. Therefore, the movement of the funding ratios in Figure 5 is for the
most part determined by the investment returns. For all funds we see the same relative
movement of the funding ratio: increasing from 1997 to 1999, decreasing from 1999
to 2001. The only exceptions are PGGM and BPMT, who show a slight decrease of
the funding ratio over the years 1997–1998. Note that stock investments do not have
to be the only risky investments that pension funds have. Several funds invest a
signiﬁcant part of their assets, that is, more than 5%, in risky investments such as
private equity or real-estate. However, the fractions invested in those categories were
either too small or relatively stable over time, so they are not considered in the
analysis.
Ultimo 2001, the funds diﬀer considerably in the fraction of stocks they have. ABP
and BPMT have around 40% stocks, with funding ratios of 1.1 and 1.2, respectively.
Philips and SPF have 55%, with funding ratios of 1.3 and 1.45. PGGM and Shell
have a high 70% stock investment, and funding ratios of 1.1 and 1.4. If we look at the
three pairs of funds with comparable stock investments, PGGM stands out as having
one of the lowest funding ratios and with the highest stock investment. It also has the
most stable fraction of stocks over time, so it might be the result of taking a long-term
calculated risk, rather than a double-or-nothing policy.
Turning to the investment patterns present in Figure 5, we see a diﬀuse behavior
for the ﬁrst period 1997–1998. Stock returns were very high in this year, but pension
funds do not show a shared opinion on whether to increase or decrease the fraction of
Table 3. Asset returns 1997–2001
Year MSCI Bonds Interest
1997 20.8% 10.2% 5.6%
1998 19.2% 8.6% 5.1%
1999 26.3% x2.0% 5.1%
2000 x10.8% 9.4% 6.1%
2001 x15.3% 10.4% 3.5%
Note : This table gives the yearly stock returns as measured by theMSCI world index, measured
in local currency. Bonds is the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index return. Interest is the
one-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate.
Figure 5. Stock investment in relation to reported funding ratios
Note : This ﬁgure shows funding ratios and fractions invested in stocks for six large Dutch
pension funds. Data are from annual reports of the respective funds, Vereniging van
Bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen (VVB). Where necessary, liabilities have been computed through
(linear) extrapolation.
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stocks. In the top panels, ABP and Shell had an increasing funding ratio, and
decreasing stock fraction. The middle two panels show funding ratios and stock
fractions with only little variation. The lower two panels show an increasing stock
fraction with either a stable or increasing funding ratio. Clearly, investment policies
diﬀered to a large extent during the year 1997.
From 1998 onward, however, identical patterns emerge. At the end of 1999 the
fraction of stocks has increased with the funding ratio, and has decreased again at
the end of 2000. From 2000 to 2001, the funding ratios decrease further, but now the
stock investments increase. The extent of the stock increase in the last year is only
small for ABP, PGGM, and SPF, but, given the large decreases in funding ratios (see
the large negative returns on stocks), it represents a signiﬁcant investment decision
for all funds. The pattern can partly be explained by funds following a ﬁxed-mix
strategy. For four of the six panels, namely ABP, PGGM, Philips, and SPF, one
could imagine that the observed stock investments are the result of a ﬁxed-mix
strategy, where rebalancing occurs at the beginning of each year. For SPF, ABP, and
Philips, though, we need to add the assumption that the strategic asset mix has
changed after 1997 or 1998. For two of the six funds, namely Shell and BPMT, it is
diﬃcult to see how a ﬁxed-mix policy would lead to the observed patterns. Over the
period 1998–2001, both funds show a series of consecutive increasing and decreasing
stock fractions of more than 7% points.
Detecting V-shapes in the graphs asks too much from the current simple setup,
although a formal test of loss-averse behavior could be accomplished with a more
extensive dataset. Also, in assessing the ﬁgures, one needs to take into account the
fact that funds diﬀer not only in their funding ratios, but also in the composition of
the members, ﬁnancial position of the sponsor, and expectation of the economic
fundamentals. This also motivates the choice for diﬀerent axes for each fund.
The relevance of the mean-shortfall results is illustrated in the situation of ABP and
PGGM, which are well known for their sheer size. In newspaper interviews, the
managers of these funds indicate that they need a fraction of stock investments to
fund the expected high liability growth. Thus, in the current model they can be seen as
typical ‘ left-siders ’ in terms of the found V-shape in this paper. Although the funds
have a nominal surplus of around 10% ultimo 2001, their ﬁnancial position in real
terms (that is, taking into account indexation) is one of shortfall, where risky
investments are needed. This is well understood in the mean-shortfall analysis of
this paper.
Clearly, the preliminary analysis of Figure 5 can at best be only suggestive about
the validity of the mean-shortfall model for DB pension funds. The main puzzle boils
down to explaining the non-decrease in the fraction of stocks in the portfolio from
2000 to 2001, despite two consecutive large negative stock returns. So far, it appears
that the mean-shortfall framework is helpful in explaining part of this puzzle.
5 Policy implications
The choice for the mean-shortfall model is rooted in the institutional setting of DB
pension funds as well as actual preferences used in ALM studies. As such, the found
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results in this paper can be seen as indicative of the drivers behind investment policies
of DB pension funds. With respect to the optimal V-shaped policy, at ﬁrst sight it is
not in accordance with current regulatory practice in for example the Netherlands.
There, regulators require funds to always remain above 100% funding, which makes
the interpretation of the left-hand side of the V-shape all the more interesting. An
interpretation of the results should take into account (i) the possible interpretations
of present value benchmarkW0
B for pension funds, and (ii) the reality of the fact that
underfunding can happen.
To start with the ﬁrst point, W0
B was deﬁned as the discounted value of the future
nominal liabilityWB with full indexation. Hence, the kink of the V-shape represents a
100% funding ratio when all future indexation is taken into account. However, in
practice pension funds report a funding ratio where liabilities are discounted at cur-
rent prices, not accounting for indexation explicitly. In the current model with 2%
inﬂation, such a funding ratio should thus be as high as 1.0215B1.35 to ensure in-
dexed liabilities by only investing in risk-free instruments yielding 4%. Considering
that most pension funds have funding ratios below 135%, the results in this paper
suggest that the left-hand side of the V-shape is the relevant area under normal con-
ditions, that is, the more a fund approaches the level of 135% funding ratio, the less it
will invest in stocks.
Secondly, the past few years with historically low stock returns have shown that
pension funds do get in a situation of underfunding. This paper shows that, under
mean-shortfall preferences, funds have a tendency to stay in stocks, even when
funding ratios are low. The intuition provided is that a risky investment is necessary
to ensure enough upside potential. Taking no risk at all might prove to give a larger
downside risk than taking calculated risks in the investment policy. For regulators,
the good news is that the results imply that pension funds would not want to sell their
stocks when returns are disappointing. Given the size of pension funds, such behavior
can have an undesirable eﬀect on the stock market. Although the immediate impact
of a single large trade on stock prices in any well-developed market is small, the
combined eﬀect of multiple pension funds selling stocks at the same time can be
signiﬁcant. The bad news is that the results show a tendency to increase risk in a
worsening situation. And that is exactly the sort of behavior that regulators would
want to prohibit.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I have introduced a simple mean-shortfall model for the investment
decision of a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension fund. Shortfall was measured relative to
the real (indexed) value of the liabilities. A V-shaped policy was found to be the
optimal investment strategy as a function of the initial funding ratio. This implies
increased risk taking for increasing initial shortfall. The sensitivity of the optimal
investment strategy has been explored for changes in the economic assumptions on
inﬂation, the correlation between stock returns and inﬂation, and the level of the real
interest rate. Results for a diﬀerent risk measure, namely downside deviation were
also obtained, closely resembling those of the mean-shortfall model. The results have
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in common that the optimal investment policies all have a typical V- or U-shaped
relation with the initial wealth of the fund. A lower risk-free interest rate and higher
inﬂation uncertainty both move the optimal policy to the right, that is, the minimum-
risk allocation is attained at higher wealth levels.
Section 4 considered patterns of portfolio adjustment versus funding ratios for six
large Dutch pension funds. It is shown that the mean-shortfall model might explain
the increasing stock fractions for funds that experienced a decreasing funding ratio.
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Appendix: Analytical solution to the basic model
For clarity, here we present the solution to a one-period model. The solution to the
15-year model is the same with the return distribution replaced by its 15-year
equivalent.
Consider the one-period mean-shortfall model given by
max
X0
E[W1]xl  E[(WBxW1)+], (A1)
s:t: W1=W0rf+X0  (u1xrf), (A2)
Deﬁne u as the return for whichW1=WB. It is given by
u=
WBxW0rf
X0
+rf: (A3)
By deﬁnition, u gives the return value below which there is shortfall, that is,
W1<WB iﬀ u1<u. This way, we can write equation (A1) as
max
X0
E[W1]xl 
Z u
0
(WBxW1)dG, (A4)
where G(.) is the distribution function of u1.
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To arrive at the ﬁrst-order condition we take the ﬁrst derivative of (A4), which is
simpliﬁed by the fact that the integrand is zero when ﬁlling in u for u1 (using Leibniz’
rule for diﬀerentiating an integral). The resulting ﬁrst-order condition to (A1) is given
by Z u
0
(rfxu1)dG=E[u1xrf]=l, (A5)
Assuming thatG(.) is unimodal, equation (A5) has two solutions in terms of u, one for
a positive and one for a negative surplus. We write them as u+ and ux, respectively.
Using the second-order conditions, it follows that the optimal solution is given by
X0*=
rf
rfx u *
S0, (A6)
where u *= u+<rf for a positive surplus, and u *= ux>rf for a negative
surplus. Hence, X0* has a V-shaped relation with the value ofW0. This completes the
solution. %
To show that an inﬁnitely high l does not lead to zero risk taking when in
underfunding, consider the following. For lpO, the ﬁrst-order condition in (A5)
simpliﬁes to Z u
0
(rfxu1)dG=0, (A7)
which has solutions u+=0 and ux>rf. So for positive surpluses, the optimal solution
is degenerate and has zero investment in the risky asset. For a negative surplus, the
solution is given by
Xm0=
rf
rfx um
S0, (A8)
where um is the u>rf that solves (A7). This proofs the fact that the overall minimum-
risk optimal investment in the risky asset, X0
m, is strictly positive. %
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